The coordinator of March 14 Forces General Secretariat Mr. Fares Souaid presented, yesterday, a critical reading of the path of March 14 movement and partisan forces throughout the past five years, in a language combining conservative rightist terms and terms used periodically in local politics. This self-criticism process holds many meanings and lessons, shedding light on the strengths and weaknesses of March 14, the latter taking its decisions in a hassle or misreading local and regional changes towards Syria and Lebanon.
Souaid took the floor before a crowd of people, upon an invitation from Issam Fares Center for Lebanon, which organizes dialogues and seminars on Lebanese Affairs. Souaid raised a question, after being introduced by the Director of the Center, Ambassador Abdallah Bou Habib, ‘Why didn’t the Lebanese succeed in managing their own business after 2005, despite the Syrian military withdrawal?’. According to Souaid, ‘the responsibility is shared by the movement of independence itself (March 14 forces), the opposition movement (March 8 forces), and the up-coming regional and international complications following the Syrian withdrawal’. He also insisted on the March 14 share of responsibility, in order to avoid being accused of disavowing any responsibility.
According to Souaid, “the independence of 2005 was the outcome of the choice made by the Maronite Patriarch between 1990 and 2005, considering as a priority to build up internal solidarity, undoubtedly leading to independence, contrary to the “minorities alliance” thesis.
He explained that “the vision of the Patriarch was based on an equation: the Christian – Muslim agreement capable of achieving peace”. He underlined “forces and figures who contributed to the achievement of independence, among whom Imam Shamseddine who supported the Taef Agreement and the establishment of the State based on such an agreement, considering it as a model agreement. After some hesitation, Shamseddine and most Shiite leaders considered this agreement as essential, not optional.”
Solidarity achieved withdrawal
He considered that “many factors converged in 2005 to achieve the Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon, among which: Christian-Muslim solidarity, since the alliance of the historical choice of the Maronite Church which was announced or mentioned in the texts of the Maronite Patriarchal Assembly, issued by Bkerke in May 2006, especially separation between “church and politics.” The Muslim block was represented, at that time, by the most prevailing currents among the Sunnis and the Druze, i.e. the Future party and the Progressive Socialist Party. The Shiite Independents were out of the confessional representation, but were definitely present in the independent public opinion which went to the street on March 14, 2005. The absence of Shiite independents was due at that time to the lack of an organized political movement and the monopoly of Amal and Hezbollah for the political Shiite confession after the Taef, with the support of the Syrian and Iranian regimes.
Regarding the UN Security Council Resolution No 1559, he said that it “goes back to strategic considerations for the American administration, which has authorized, in agreement with Israel, the Syrian regime to meddle with the Lebanese Affairs within three decades, and finally decided the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Pretending that 2005 independence is a product made by Lebanon is null and void. Without the Lebanese initiative and the struggling roots extending throughout 15 years, the implementation of Resolution 1559 wouldn’t have been possible unless with the Iraqi bloody style of 2003.”